Economic Theory and Experiments Seminar - Aytek Erdil (University of Cambridge)

Title:  Widening Access in University Admissions

Abstract:  Widening access to higher education remains a significant policy goal. Universities often frame and pursue these goals via access targets (aimed number of students from disadvantaged backgrounds) as part of their intake targets (aimed total number of students). However, universities' desire to exercise flexibility in their intake and access targets constitutes a novel challenge in designing a centralised admissions system. We introduce the Flexible Access and Intake Targets mechanism that is strategy-proof for the students and enables the universities to pursue their flexible intake and access targets with the most qualified applicants possible. The mechanism is based on an iterative market clearing procedure whose key element is its systematic adjustment of targets in each step in response to fluctuations in applicant numbers. We formulate a fairness concept for matchings that strikes a balance between widening access and merit-based allocation. Our mechanism finds the unique student-optimal fair matching.