Australasian Microeconomic Theory Seminar - Fuhito Kojima (U of Tokyo)

Title: Weak Monotone Comparative Statics

Abstract: We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics based on weak set order,
or in short weak monotone comparative statics, and identify the enabling conditions
in the context of individual choices, Pareto optimal choices for a coalition of agents,
and Nash equilibria of games. Compared with the existing theory based on strong set
order, the conditions for weak monotone comparative statics are weaker, sometimes
considerably, in terms of the structure of the choice environment and underlying
preferences of agents. We apply the theory to establish existence and monotone
comparative statics of Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities and
of stable many-to-one matchings in two-sided matching problems, allowing for general
preferences that accommodate indifferences and incomplete preferences.