The CMD and its affiliates publish research in leading outlets including the American Economic Review, Econometrica and the Journal of Political Economy. Other outlets include Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of the European Economic Association, Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
Anderson, S., Erkal, N and Piccinin, D. Aggregative Games and Oligopoly Theory: Short-run and Long-run Analysis. RAND Journal of Economics (forthcoming)
Balbuzanov, I. Short trading cycles: Paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences. Mathematical Social Sciences (forthcoming)
Baranov, V., Bhalotra, S., Biroli, P., Maselko, J. Maternal Depression, Women's Empowerment, and Parental Investment: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial. American Economic Review (forthcoming).
Baranov, V., Haushofer, J., Jang, C. Can Positive Psychology Improve Psychological Wellbeing and Economic Decision-Making? Experimental Evidence from Kenya. Economic Development and Culture Change (forthcoming).
Barkley, A., Groeger, J., and Miller, R.A. Bidding Frictions in Ascending Auctions. Journal of Econometrics (forthcoming).
Ehsani, M.A, Chan, M., Ganjali, M., Zamanzadeh, A. Unemployment Duration, Fiscal and Monetary Policies, and the Output Gap: How do the Quantile Relationships Look Like? Economic Modelling (forthcoming).
Loertscher, S., Marx, L. 2020. A Dominant-Strategy Asset Market Mechanism. Games and Economic Behavior, 120:1-15.
Loertscher, S., Niedermayer, A. 2020. Entry-Deterring Agency. Games and Economic Behavior, 119:172-188.
Balbuzanov, I. 2019.Lies and consequences: The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes. International Journal of Game Theory, 48(4):1203-1240.
Balbuzanov, I., Kotowski, M. 2019. Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange. Econometrica, 87(5):1663-1692.
Baranov, V., Bhalotra, S., Gallis, J., Hagaman, A., Maselko, J., Sikander, S., Turner, E. 2019. The psychosocial impacts on maternal functional impairment: longitudinal findings from a pregnancy-birth cohort study in rural Pakistan. PLOS ONE, 14(11):e0225163.
Byrne, D.P. 2019. Gasoline Pricing in the Country and the City. Review of Industrial Organization, 55 (2):209-235.
Byrne, D.P., de Roos, N. 2019. Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline. American Economic Review, 109(2):591-619.
Coulomb, R., Lecuyer, O., Vogt-Schilb, A. 2019. Optimal Transition from Coal to Gas and Renewable Power Under Capacity Constraints and Adjustment Costs. Environmental and Resource Economics, 73(2):557-590.
Delacretaz, D., Loertscher, S., Marx, L.M., Wilkening, T. 2019.Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade. Journal of Economic Theory, 179(1):416-454.
Beattie, G., Han, Y., La Nauze, A. 2019. Conservation Spillovers: the Effect of Rooftop Solar on Climate Change Beliefs. Environmental and Resource Economics, 74(3).
La Nauze, A. 2019. Power From the People: Rooftop Solar and a Downward-Sloping Supply of Electricity. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 6(6).
La Nauze, A., Mezzetti, C. 2019. Dynamic Incentive Regulation of Diffuse Pollution. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 93(1):101-124.
Loertscher, S., Mezzetti, C. 2019. The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 84:101-106.
Loertscher, S., Riordan, M.H. 2019. Make and Buy: Outsourcing, Vertical Integration, and Cost Reduction. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11(1):105-23.
Loertscher, S., Wasser, C. 2019. Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships. Theoretical Economics, 14(3):1063–1114.
Loertscher, S., Marx, LM. 2019. Merger Review for Markets with Buyer Power. Journal of Political Economy, 127(6).
Loertscher, S., Marx, LM. 2019. Merger Review with Intermediate Buyer Power. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 67.
Loertscher, S., Marx, LM. 2019. Mix-and-Match Divestitures and Merger Harm. Japanese Economic Review, 70 (3):346-366.
Hatfield, JW., Kominers, SD, Nichifor, A, Ostrovsky, M and Westkamp, A. 2019. Full Substitutability. Theoretical Economics , 14:1535-1590.
Klaus, B., Nichifor, A. 2019. Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices. Economic Theory:1-20.
Pan, S. 2019.The instability of matching with overconfident agents. Games and Economic Behavior, 113 (1):396-415.
Plott, C., Roll, R., Seo, H., Zhao, H. 2019. Tick size, price grids and market performance: Stable matches as a model of market dynamics and equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior, 118:7-28.
Baranov, V., Kohler, H-P. 2018. The Impact of AIDS Treatment of Savings and Human Capital Investment in Malawi. American Economics Journal: Applied Economics, 10(1):266-306.
Byrne, D.P., Nah, J.S, Xue, P. 2018. Australia Has the World’s Beset Petrol Price Data: FuelWatch and FuelCheck. Australian Economic Review, 51
Byrne, D.P., La Nauze, A., Martin, L. 2018. Tell Me Something I Don’t Already Know: Informedness and the Impact of Information Programs. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 100:510-527.
Chan, M., Kwok, S. 2018. Connecting the markets? Recent evidence on China’s capital account liberalization. Economic Modelling, 70.
Chan, M., Liu, K. 2018. Life-cycle and intergenerational effects of child care reforms. Quantitative Economics, 9(2).
Chan, M. 2018. Measuring the effects of Welfare Time Limits. Journal of Human Resources, 53(1).
Chan, M., Zeng, G. 2018. Unintended consequences of supply-side cost control? Evidence from China’s new cooperative medical scheme. Journal of Health Economics, 61.
Aghion, P., Chan, M., Moffitt, R., Rey, H. 2018. Welfare Reform and the Labor Market. Annual Review of Economics, 10.
Coulomb R., Henriet, F. 2018. The Grey Paradox: How fossil-fuels owners can benefit from carbon taxation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 87(c):206-223.
de Fontenay, C. 2018. Is Microfinance Raising Village Income? The Issue of Excess Entry. Economics Letters, 165:17-20.
Erkal, N., Gangadharan, L., Han Koh, B. 2018. Monetary and Non-Monetary Incentives in Real-effort Tournaments. European Economic Review, 101:528-545.
Pan, S. 2018. Exploding offers and unravelling in two-sided matching markets. International Journal of Game Theory, 47(1).
Gong, Q., Pan, S., Yang, H. 2018. Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms. The BE. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
Court D., Gillen, B., McKenzie, J., Plott, C. 2018. Two Information Aggregation Mechanisms for Predicting the Opening Weekend Box Office Revenues of Films: Box Office Prophecy and Guess of Guesses. Economic Theory, 65:25-54.
Recalde, M., Riedl, A., Vesterlund, L. 2018. Error-prone inference from response time: The case of intuitive generosity in public-good games. Journal of Public Economics, 160.
Burfurd, I., Wilkening, T. 2018. Experimental guidance for eliciting beliefs with the Stochastic Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 4(1).
Aghion, P., Fehr, E., Holden, R., Wilkening, T. 2018. The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation-An Empirical Investigation. Journal of the European Economic Association, 16(1):232-274.
Xiao, J. 2018. All-pay contests with performance spillovers. Mathematical Social Sciences, 92.
Xiao, J. 2018. Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: Complete results. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 74.
Xiao, J. 2018. Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game. Games and Economic Behavior, 107 (C):364-379.
Celen, B. 2017. On Blame and Reciprocity: Theory and Experiments. Journal of Economic Theory,169:62-92.
Chan, M. 2017. Welfare Dependence and Self-Control: An Empirical Analysis. The Review of Economic Studies, 84(4):1379-1423.
Chan, M., Kwok, S. 2017. Risk-sharing, market imperfections, asset prices: Evidence from China's stock market liberalization. Journal of Banking & Finance, 84:166-187.
Evans N., Moore, T., Garthwaite,C. 2017. The White/Black Educational Gap, Stalled Progress, and the Long-term Consequences of the Emergence of Crack Cocaine Markets. Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(5):832-847.
Gelber, A., Moore, T., Strand A. 2017. The Effect of Disability Insurance Payments on Beneficiaries’ Earnings. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9 (3):229-61.
Loertscher, S., Marx, L. 2017. Club Good Intermediaries. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 50:430-459.
Loertscher, S., Marx, L. 2017.Auctions with Bid Credits and Resale. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 55:58-90
Loertscher, S., Muir, E., Taylor, P. 2017. A general noncentral hypergeometric distribution. Communications in Statistics – Theoryand Methods, 46(9):4579-4598.
Borokov, K., Muir, E. 2017. Approximating the equilibrium quantity traded and welfare in large markets. Stochastic Models, 33(3):411-429.
Gillen, B., Plott, C., Shum, M. 2017. A Parimutuel-like Mechanism for Information Aggregation: Forecasting inside Intel. Journal of Political Economy, 125(4):1075-1099.
Pastor-Bernier, A., Plott, C., Schultz, W. 2017. Monkeys Choose as if Maximizing Utility in Compliance with the Basic Principles of revealed Preference Theory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 114(10):1766-1775.
Plott, C., Pogorelskiy, K. 2017. Call Market Experiments: Efficiency and Price Discovery through Multiple Calls and Emergent Newton Adjustments. American Economic Journal Microeconomics, 9(4):1-41.
Rossiter A. and Hester, S. 2017. Designing biosecurity inspection regimes to account for stakeholder incentives: An inspection game approach. Economic Record, 93(301):277-301.
Wilkening, T. 2017. Information and the persistence of private-order contract enforcement institutions: An experimental analysis. European Economic Review, 89:193-215.
Aghion, P., Fehr, E., Holden, R. and Wilkening, T. 2017. The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation – An Empirical Investigation. Journal of the European Economic Association, 16 (1):232-274.
Korcak, O., Iosifidis, G., Alpcan, T. and Koutsopoulos, I. 2016. Operator Collusion and Market Regulation Policies for Wireless Spectrum Management. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 15(10):2537- 2549.
Balbuzanov I. 2016. Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism. Social Choice and Welfare, 42(3):511-520.
Byrne D. and de Roos N. 2016. Consumer Search in Retail Gasoline Markets. Journal of Industrial Economics, 65(1).
Celen, B. and Ozgur, O. 2016. Final Offer Arbitration with Uncertainty Averse Parties. Games and Economic Behaviour.
Chan, M., Kwok, S. 2016. Capital account liberalization and dynamic price discovery: evidence from Chinese cross-listed stocks. Journal of Applied Economics, 48(6):517-535.
Donazzan M., Erkal N. and Koh B.H. 2016. Impact of Rebates and Refunds on Contributions to Threshold Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment. Southern Economic Journal, 83(1):69-86.
Evans N., Garthwaite C. and Moore T. 2016. The White/Black Educational Gap, Stalled Progress, and the Long-term Consequences of the Emergence of Crack Cocaine Markets. Review of Economics and Statistics, 98 (5):832-847.
Gelber A., Moore T. and Strand A. 2016. The Effect of Disability Insurance Payments on Beneficiaries’ Earnings. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9 (3):229-61.
Hatfield, J.W., Plott, C., Tanaka, T. 2016. Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior, 99:134-163.
Rossiter A., Hester S., Aston C., Sibley J., Stoneham G. and Woodhams F. 2016. CEBRA Project 1304C: Incentives for Importer Choices, Final Report, 22 September. Available from: http://cebra. unimelb.edu.au/publications/reports.
Cheong L., Bleisch S., Kealy A., Tolhurst K., Wilkening T., Duckham M. 2016. Evaluating the Impact of Visualization of Wildfire Hazard Upon Decision-Making Uncertainty. International Journal of Geographical Information Science, 30(7):1377-1404.
Xiao J. 2016. Asymmetric All-Pay Contests with Heterogeneous Prizes. Journal of Economic Theory, 163:178-221.
Artemov G. 2015. Time and Nash implementation. Games and Economic Behavior, 91:229-236.
Baranov, V., Bennett, D., and Kohler, HP. 2015. The Indirect Impact of Antiretroviral Therapy: Mortality Risk, Mental Health, and HIV-Negative Labor Supply. Journal of Health Economics, 44:195-211
Byrne D. 2015. Testing Models of Differentiated Products Markets: Consolidation in the Cable TV Industry. International Economic Review, 56(3):805-850.
Byrne D. 2015. Testing Differentiated Products Models: Consolidation in the Cable TV Industry”, International Economic Review, 2015.
Byrne D., Leslie G. W. and Ware R. 2015. How do Consumers Respond to Gasoline Price Cycles? The Energy Journal, 36(1):115-147.
Baron J., Cobb-Clark D. and Erkal N. 2015. Welfare Receipt and the Intergenerational Transmission of Work-Welfare Norms. Southern Economic Journal, 82(1):208-234.
Cameron L., Erkal N., Gangadharan L. and Zhang M. 2015. Cultural Integration: Experimental Evidence of Convergence in Immigrants’ Preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 111:38-58.
Loertscher S., Marx L. and Wilkening T. 2015. A long way coming: Designing centralized markets with privately informed buyers and sellers. Journal of Economic Literature, 53(4):857-897.
Marshall, R.C., Marx, L., Samkharadze, L. 2015. Buyer resistance for cartel versus merger. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 39:71-80.
Marshall, R.C, Marx, L., Mezzetti, C. 2015. Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3):205-240.
Moore T. 2015. The Employment Effects of Terminating Disability Benefits. Journal of Public Economics, 104:30-43.
Cvitanic, J., Plott, C., Tseng, C-Y. 2015. Markets with random lifetimes and private values: mean reversion and option to trade. Decisions in Economics and Finance, 38(1):1-19.
Llewellyn, M., Plott, C. 2015. Information Transfer and Aggregation in an Uniformed Committee: A Model for the Selection and Use of Biased Expert Advice. European Journal of Political Economy, 40:208-223.
Abhishek V, Hajek B. and Williams S.R. 2015. On Bidding with Securities: Risk Aversion and Positive Dependence. Games and Economic Behavior, 90:66-80.
Aghion P., Fehr H., Holden R., Wilkening T. 2015. The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation – An Empirical investigation. Journal of the European Economic Association, CESifo Working Paper Series 5300, CESifo Group Munich.
Alpcan T, Boche H, Chorppath, A.K. 2014. Games and mechanisms for networked systems: incentives and algorithms in Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation, Eds. T. Alpcan, H. Boche, M. L. Honig, and H. V. Poor, Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-28.
Brindisi, F, Celen, B and Hyndman, K. 2014. The Effect of Endogenous Timing on Coordination Under Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Study Games and Economic Behavior, 86(2):264-281.
Chan, M., Michaelides, M., Zhang, S. 2014. Who Receives Unemployment Insurance? Research in Applied Economics, 6(3).
de Fontenay, C. 2014. Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities”, C. de Fontenay, Journal of Industrial Economics.
Erkal, N and Minehart, D. 2014. Optimal Technology Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of R&D, N. Erkal and D. Minehart, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 23(1):149-177.
Loertscher, S and Marx, L. 2014. Economics and the efficient allocation of spectrum licenses, in: Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Access, edited by T. Alpcan, H. Boche, M.L. Honig and H.V. Poor, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 553-578.
Hodler, R, Loertscher, S and Rohner, D. 2014. Persuasion, Binary Choice, and the Costs of Dishonesty” Economics Letters.
Loertscher, S and Reisinger, M. 2014. Market structure and the competitive effects of vertical integration” RAND Journal of Economics.
Loertscher, S and Marx, L. 2014. A Tractable Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)- Assignments of Spectrum Licenses”, S. Loertscher and L. Marx, Review of Industrial Organization.
Nemes, V., La Nauze, A., Walsh, C., Fletcher, T., Bos, D., Rossrakesh, S. and Stoneham, G. 2014. Saving a creek one bid at a time: A uniform price auction for urban stormwater retention. Urban Water Journal, 13(3):232-241.
Marx, L., Mezzetti, C. 2014. Effects of antitrust leniency on concealment effort by colluding firms. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 2(2):305-332.
Chillemi, O and Mezzetti, C. 2014. Optimal Procurement Mechanisms: Bidding on Price and Damages for Breach” Economic Theory, 55(2):335-355.
Plott, C. 2014. Public Choice and the Development of Modern Laboratory Experimental Methods in Economics and Political Science. Constitutional Political Economy, 5(4):331-353.
Cason, T., Plott, C. 2014. Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing. Journal of Political Economy, 122(6):1235-1270.
Lee, H-Y., Maron, T, Plott, C. 2014. The Contiuous Combinatorial Auction Architecture. The American Economic Review, 104(5):452-456.
Artemov G. 2013. An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo Economics Letters, 122(3):380-385.
Artemov G, Kunimoto T and Serrano R. 2013. Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine Robust Journal of Economic Theory, 148(2):424-447.
Bardsley P, Erkal N, Nikiforakis N, and Wilkening T. 2013. Recursive contracts, firm longevity, and rat races: An experimental analysis, European Economic Review, 61(C):217-231.
Bardsley P and Burfurd I. 2013. Auctioning Contracts for Environmental Services” Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 57(2):253-272.
Byrne D, Leslie G, and Ware R. 2013. How do Consumers Respond to Retail Gasoline Price Cycles?” The Energy Journal.
Chan, M. 2013. A Dynamic Model of Welfare Reform. Econometrica, 81(3):941-1001.
Harrison, AE, Martin L and Nataraj, S. 2013. Learning Versus Stealing: How Important are Market-Share Reallocations to India's Productivity Growth? World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol 27(2):202-228.
Brewer, P., Cvitanic, J., Plott, C. 2013. Market Microstructure Design and Flash Crashes: a Simulation Approach. Journal of Applied Economics, 16(2):223-250.
Fehr E, Herz H, and Wilkening T. 2013. The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power American Economic Review, 103(4):1325-59.
Alpcan T, Boche H, Honig ML & Poor HV (eds).2012. Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Access. Cambridge, United Kindgom: Cambridge University Press.
Hyndman K. 2012. Social Learning through Endogenous Information Acquisition: An Experiment. Management Science, 58(8):1525–1548.
Celen B & Ozerturk S. 2012. Acquisition of Information to Diversify Contractual Risk. International Economic Review, 53(1):133–156.
Celen B & Hyndman K. 2012. An Experiment of Social Learning with Endogenous Timing. Review of Economic Design, 16(2-3):251-268.
Celen B. 2012. Informativeness of Experiments for MEU. 2012. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 48(6):404–406.
Baker S & Mezzetti C. 2012. A Theory of Rational Jurisprudence. Journal of Political Economy, 120 (3):513-551.
Mezzetti C & Renou L. 2012. Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 147(6):2357-2375.
Hatfield, J.W., Plott, C., Tanaka, T. 2012. Understanding Price Controls and Nonprice Competition with Matching Theory. American Economic Review, 102(3):371-375
Merlob, B., Plott, C., Zhang, Y. 2012. The CMS Auction: Experimental Studies of a Median-Bid Procurement Auction with Nonbinding Bids. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(2):793-827.
Plott, C. 2012. Personal reflections on the influence of Buchanan, Tullock, and the Calculus of Consent. Public Choice, 152:293-298.
Nikiforakis N, Noussair CN & Wilkening T. 2012.Normative Conflict & Feuds: The Limits of Self-Enforcement. Journal of Public Economics, 96(9-10):797-807.
Stoneham G, O’Keefe A, Eigenraam M & Bain D. 2012 Creating physical environmental asset accounts from markets for ecosystem conservation. Ecological Economics, 82:114-122.
Warren P & Wilkening T. 2012. Regulatory Fog: The Informational Origins of Regulatory Persistence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 84(3):840-856