My name is Sheng Huang. I joined the Finance PhD program in 2018. I will be on the 2022/2023 job market. My research interest is in empirical corporate finance. Specifically, my research examines both the determinants and the impacts of blockholder ownership in a firm. There is heterogeneity across blockholders in terms of their objectives when investing in a firm. I focus on the group of blockholders whose objective is to monitor the firm and engage in corporate governance.
Job market paper
Blockholder and CEO Wealth-Performance Sensitivity
My job market paper examines the relation between CEO incentives provided by equity-based compensation and blockholder monitoring, which are two important measures to mitigate the agency issue. Empirically, I find that higher CEO incentives reduce blockholder ownership in a firm, and this negative relation is stronger in firms where blockholder monitoring is more likely. This provides support for the substitution effect of CEO incentives on blockholder monitoring. On the theory front, I extend the model of Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), where managerial incentives are found to also complement blockholder monitoring, and I show that the substitution effect dominates the complementary effect.